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Abstract—A fundamental question in traffic theory concerns
how drivers behave in response to sudden fluctuations of traffic
congestion, and to what extent navigation apps can benefit the
overall traffic system in these cases. In this paper, we study
the stability of the equilibrium points of traffic networks under
real-time app-informed routing. We propose a dynamical routing
model to describe the real-time route selection mechanism that
is at the core of app-informed routing, and we leverage the
theory of passivity in nonlinear dynamical systems to provide a
theoretical framework to explain emerging dynamical behaviors
in real-world networks. We demonstrate for the first time the
existence of oscillatory trajectories due to the general adoption of
routing apps, which demonstrate how drivers continuously switch
between highways in the attempt of minimizing their travel time
to destination. Further, we propose a family of control policies to
ensure the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium points, which
relies on the idea of regulating the rate at which travelers react
to traffic congestion. Illustrative numerical simulations combined
with empirical data from highway sensors illustrate our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic networks are fundamental components of modern
societies, making economic activity possible by enabling the
transfer of passengers, goods, and services in a timely and
reliable fashion. Despite their economical importance, traffic
networks are impaired by the outstanding problem of traffic
congestion, which causes the waste of over 3 billions of gal-
lons of fuel each year in the United States [1]. Accompanied
by increasing levels of congestion is a drop in the system
performance, a phenomenon that increasingly conditions the
behavior of its users, forcing travelers to shift the time of
their morning commute or to adopt alternative routes that are
often undesirable and suboptimal. These alternative routes are
increasingly made available by routing apps (such as Google
Maps, Inrix, Waze, etc.), which provide reliable minimum-
time routing suggestions to the travelers based on real-time
congestion information. Despite the unprecedented widespread
use of app-based routing systems, a characterization of the
impact of these devices on the traffic network for general,
possibly capacitated, networks has remained elusive until now.
In this work, we study the emerging dynamical behaviors
arising when real-time routing decisions are combined with
capacitated traffic networks, i.e., where traffic flows have
finite propagation times. Our models allow us to take into
account the fact that traffic conditions can change while
travelers are traversing the network, and that navigation apps
will instantaneously respond by updating the route of each
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driver at her next available junction. Differently from standard
methods to study congestion-responsive routing, the focus of
this work is on the dynamical behavior of the traffic network,
rather than on the economic properties of its equilibria. Our
results demonstrate that the general adoption of navigation
apps will maximize the throughput of flow across the network,
thus bringing valuable benefits to the traffic infrastructure.
Unfortunately, our findings also demonstrate that navigation
apps can deteriorate the stability of the traffic system, and
can results in the emergence of undesirable traffic phenomena
such as temporal oscillations of traffic congestion. Hence, our
results demonstrate that the benefits in the adoption of real-
time routing systems come at the cost of increased system
fragility, and suggest that adequate information design is
necessary to overcome these limitations and ensure robustness.
Related Work. This work brings together and extends two
streams of independent literature. On the one hand, dynamical
traffic network models have widely been studied after the
popularization of the Cell Transmission Model [2]. In this line
of research, the main emphasis has been on the development
of precise numerical models that capture the behavior of the
network in several congestion regimes [3], and on character-
izing the properties of the equilibria of the network [4], while
considering simplified (often time-invariant) routing models.
On the other hand, the routing decisions of the travelers have
been studied by adopting simplified traffic models in the game-
theoretic setting of a routing game (see e.g. [5]–[7]). In these
models, traffic flows propagate instantaneously across the
network, and drivers make path choices by minimizing their
personal travel times in response to day-to-day observations of
congestion [8]. Recently, Evolutionary Game-Theory [9] has
been applied to the routing game [10], [11], to capture not only
the properties of the equilibria of the system, but also the time
evolution of its trajectories. Although these works represent a
significant step towards understanding the dynamics of traffic
routing, the use of simplified traffic models can only model
day-to-day reactions to changes in congestion, and lacks to
explain emerging dynamical behaviors observed in the data.
An important attempt to characterize the impact of
congestion-dependent routing on the dynamical behavior of
traffic are the recent works [12], [13], which are however
limited to routing models that are local, where travelers make
decisions based on the congestion one-road ahead. Finally, to
the best of the author’s knowledge, the pioneering work [14]
was one of the few attempts to highlight that simplifications
in either the traffic model or the routing model are inadequate
to accurately predict traffic patterns, and to demonstrate in
simulation that in certain regimes static flow models indicate
that routing apps can improve network congestion, whereas
dynamical models demonstrate the opposite.
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2Contribution. The contribution of this work is fourfold.
First, we propose a dynamical decision model to capture
the reactions of app-informed travelers in response to traffic
congestion. Our model is inspired from evolutionary models
(or learning models) in biology and game theory, and captures
a setting where routing apps use the observations of other
travelers to instantaneously adjust their routing suggestions.
Second, we study the properties of the fixed point of a traffic
system where our routing decision model is coupled with a dy-
namical traffic model. We establish a connection between the
properties of the equilibrium points and the notion of Wardrop
equilibrium [8]. Our results show that, when app-informed
travelers can update their routing preferences at every junction
of the network based on the instantaneous congestion, the
system admits an equilibrium point that satisfies the Wardrop
First Principle. This observation extends Wardrop’s practical
observations, which were so far limited to scenarios where
travelers update their congestion information from day to day.
Third, we characterize the Lyapunov stability of the fixed
points of the coupled routing-traffic system. Our analysis relies
on the theory of passivity for nonlinear dynamical systems
[15], and it shows that the equilibrium points are stable but not
always asymptotically stable. Moreover, for a network com-
posed of two parallel highways we show the existence of limit
cycles, thus demonstrating that traffic congestion can oscillate
over time, a phenomenon that was recently observed in [16].
Fourth, we propose a control technique to ensure the
asymptotic stability of the fixed points. Our method relies
on regulating the rates at which travelers react to congestion
information, a behavior that can be achieved by appropriately
designing the frequency at which navigation apps update
the routing suggestions provided to the travelers. Our results
suggest that, in order to achieve asymptotic stability of the
equilibrium points, travelers that are close to the network
origin must react faster to traffic congestion as opposed to
travelers that are located in the proximity of the destination.
Organization. This paper is organized as follows. Section
II illustrates our traffic network model, our routing decision
model, and reviews the Wardrop First Principle. Section III
characterizes the properties of the equilibrium points, and
contains a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their
existence. Section IV contains the stability analysis of the
equilibrium points, and illustrates through an example the
existence of oscillatory trajectories. Section V proposes a
control technique to ensure the asymptotic stability of the
fixed points, and Section VI illustrates our findings through
a set of simulations. Finally, Section VII summarizes our
conclusions, while Appendix A contains a primer on concepts
from nonlinear system theory that are relevant to this work.
Notation. A directed graph G = (V,L), consists of a set of
vertices V and a set of directed links (or edges) L ⊆ V × V .
We use the notation ` = (v, w) to denote a directed link from
node v ∈ V to node w ∈ V and, for each node v, we let vout =
{(z, w) ∈ L : z = v} be the set of its outgoing links and
vin = {(w, z) ∈ L : z = v} be the set of its incoming links.
A path in G is a subgraph p = ({v1, . . . , vk}, {`1, . . . , `k}),
such that vi 6= vj for all i 6= j, and `i = (vi, vi+1) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. A path p is simple (or edge-disjoint) if
no link is repeated in p. We will say that a path starts at v1
and ends at vk, and use the compact notation p = pv1→vk . A
cycle is a path where the first and last vertex are identical, i.e.,
v1 = vk. Finally, G is acyclic if it contains no cycles.
II. TRAFFIC NETWORK AND APP ROUTING MODELS
This section is organized into three main parts. First, we
discuss a traffic model that captures the physical characteristics
of roads and traffic junctions. Second, we introduce a decision
model to capture the routing behavior of app-informed trav-
elers in response to traffic congestion. Third, we review the
framework that describes the Wardrop First Principle.
A. Traffic Network Model
We model a traffic network as a directed acyclic graph G =
(V,L), where L = {1, . . . n} ⊆ V×V models the set of traffic
roads (or links), and V = {v1, . . . , vν} models the set of traffic
junctions (or nodes). Every traffic junction is composed of a set
of ramps, each interconnecting a pair of freeways. We denote
the set of traffic ramps (or adjacent links) by A ⊆ L×L and
let A` be the set of ramps available upon exiting `, that is,
A := {(`,m) : ∃ v ∈ V s.t. ` ∈ vin and m ∈ vout},
A` := {m ∈ L : ∃(`,m) ∈ A}. (1)
We describe the macroscopic behavior of each link ` ∈ L by
means of a dynamical equation that captures the conservation
of flows between upstream and downstream:
x˙` = f
in
` (x)− f out` (xi),
where x` : R≥0 → X , X ⊆ R≥0, is the traffic density in the
link, f in` : X → F , F ⊆ R≥0, is the inflow of traffic at the link
upstream, and f out` : X → F is the outflow of traffic at the link
downstream. We make the following technical assumption.
(A1) For all ` ∈ L, f out` (x`) = 0 only if x` = 0. Moreover,
f out` is differentiable, non-decreasing, and upper bounded
by the flow capacity of the link C` ∈ R≥0:
d
dx`
f out` (x`) ≥ 0 and sup
x`
f out` (x`) = C`.
We discuss in the following remark possible choices of outflow
functions commonly adopted in practice.
Example 1: (Common Link Outflow Functions) A common
choice for the link outflow function is the linear saturation
function, originally adopted by the Cell Transmission Model
[2], described by
f out` (x`) = min{v`x`, C`},
where v` ∈ R>0 models the free-flow speed of the link. Linear
outflow functions have also been considered in the literature
thanks to their simplicity [17]:
f out` (x`) = v`x`,
where, in this case, C` = +∞. Alternatively, exponential
saturation functions have widely been adopted in the recent
literature (see e.g. [4]):
f out` (x`) = C`(1− exp(a`x`)),
3where a` ∈ (0,∞). 
We associate a routing ratio r`m ∈ [0, 1] to every pair of
adjacent links (`,m) ∈ A to describe the fraction of traffic
flow entering link m upon exiting `, with
∑
m r`m = 1. We
combine the routing ratios into a matrix R = [r`m] ∈ Rn×n,
where we let r`m = 0 if ` and m are not adjacent (`,m) 6∈ A,
and we denote by RG the set of feasible routing ratios for the
network defined by G. That is,
RG := {r`m : r`m = 0 if (`,m) 6∈ A, and
∑
m∈L
r`m = 1}.
At every ramp, traffic flows are transferred from the incoming
link to the outgoing link as described by the routing ratios:
f inm(x) =
∑
`∈L
r`mf
out
` (x`).
We focus on single-commodity networks, where an inflow
of vehicles λ¯ : R≥0 → F enters the network at a (unique)
source link s ∈ L, and traffic flows exit the network at a
(unique) destination link d ∈ L. In the remainder, we adopt
the convention s = 1 and d = n. We describe the overall
network dynamics by combining the dynamical models of all
links in a vector equation of the form
x˙ = (RT − I)f(x) + λ, (2)
where I ∈ Rn×n denotes the identity matrix, x =
[x1, . . . , xn]
T is the vector of traffic densities in the links,
f = [f out1 , . . . , f
out
n ]
T is the vector of link outflows, and
λ = [λ¯, . . . , 0]T denotes the inflow vector. Finally, we illustrate
our model of traffic network in Example 2, and we discuss the
relationship between our model and the well-established Cell
Transmission Model in Remark 1.
Example 2: (Dynamical Traffic Model) Consider the seven-
link network illustrated in Fig. 1. The traffic network model
(2) is composed of the following seven dynamical equations:
x˙1 = −f out1 (x1) + λ¯,
x˙2 = −f out2 (x2) + r12f out1 (x1),
x˙3 = −f out3 (x3) + r13f out1 (x1),
x˙4 = −f out4 (x4) + r24f out2 (x2),
x˙5 = −f out5 (x5) + r25f out2 (x2),
x˙6 = −f out6 (x6) + f out3 (x3) + f out4 (x4),
x˙7 = −f out7 (x7) + f out5 (x5) + f out6 (x6),
where
RG = {r12, r13, r24, r25 : r12 + r13 = 1, r24 + r25 = 1}.

Remark 1: (Capturing Backwards Propagation) Our model
can be interpreted as a simplified version of the Cell Transmis-
sion Model [2]. In fact, while in the Cell Transmission Model
highways are characterized by two fundamental functions (a
link demand function and a link supply function), our model
only captures capacities in the flows through the link outflow
functions f out` . As a result, in our model density accumulation
can happen on the links and congestion does not propagate
through the junctions (and thus corresponds to a vertical queue
2
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Fig. 1. (a) Seven-highway network discussed in examples 2 and 3. (b) We
associate two variables to each link: the link travel cost τ` (the travel time
to traverse that link) and the link perceived cost pi` (the total travel cost of
reaching the network destination from that link).
model). While more general traffic models could be considered
in future works, we note that density capacities can be captured
in our model by considering unbounded link delay functions,
as we do in Section III-C. 
B. Congestion-Responsive Routing Model
In what follows, we present a dynamical decision model to
capture the behavior of app-informed travelers in response to
congestion. To this aim, we associate a state-dependent travel
cost to each link of the network
τ` : X → T , T ⊆ R≥0,
which describes the instantaneous travel cost (or travel delay)
of traversing link `. We denote by τ(x) = [τ1, . . . , τn]T
the joint vector of travel costs, and we make the following
technical assumption.
(A2) For all ` ∈ L, the travel cost τ`(x`) is differentiable and
non-decreasing.
To capture the fact that travelers wish to minimize the
overall (total) travel time between their current location and
their destination, we associate to each link ` a perceived cost:
pi` : Xn → T ,
which describes the cost of link ` that is perceived by the
travelers. The perceived cost is a quantity that, in general,
includes the combined cost of traversing multiple links (e.g. a
path in the graph). In this work, we model the perceived costs
as the instantaneous minimum travel times to destination (see
Fig. 1(b))
pi`(x) = τ`(x`) + min
m∈A`
pim(x). (3)
We note that the above equation is a recursive definition, and:
(i) given the current traffic state, the set of perceived costs
can be computed backwards from the network destination to
every link in the graph, and (ii) the above equation states that
a traveler located at any point in the traffic network perceives a
cost that is equal to the instantaneous minimum travel time to
destination. We discuss and generalize the choice of perceived
costs in Remark 2.
Remark 2: (Choices of Perceived Costs) A choice that
generalizes (3) is the following convex combination:
pi`(x) = α`τ`(x`) + (1− α`) min
m∈A`
pim(x),
4where α` ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that describes the level of
confidence in the observed global congestion information. For
instance, the special case α` = 1 correspond to a situation
where the drivers rely only local congestion information, while
α` = 0 models a scenario where drivers rely on global
congestion information, which is the focus of this work. An
intermediate value of α` can be interpreted as the level of
confidence in the knowledge of the travel delay of links that
are distant in the network. Although all the results presented
in this paper hold for the generalized perceived cost model, in
the remainder of this paper we focus on the model (3) for the
clarity of illustration. 
To model the reactions of app-informed travelers to changes
in the traffic state, we assume that at every node of the
network drivers will instantaneously update their routing by
increasingly avoiding the links with higher perceived cost
(in the current congestion regime). To this aim, we model
the aggregate routing ratios as time-varying quantities r`m :
R≥0 → [0, 1] that obey a selection mechanism inspired by the
replicator dynamics [9]:
δ−1`mr˙`m = r`m (
∑
q
r`qpiq − pim)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a`m(x)
, (4)
where a`m : Xn → R is a function that describes the appeal of
entering link m upon exiting `, and δ`m ∈ R>0 is the reaction
rate, namely a scalar variable that captures the rate at which
travelers react to changes in the traffic state.
The dynamical equation (4) describes a real-time reaction
mechanism, where routing apps continuously revise their
routing recommendations by increasingly suggesting links that
have a more desirable travel time to destination, as detailed
next. A positive appeal (a`m > 0) implies that the perceived
travel cost of link m is preferable over the travel cost of
alternative links upon exiting ` (i.e. pim <
∑
q r`qpiq). Hence,
equation (4) states that the fraction of travelers choosing m
will increase over time (r˙`m > 0). As a result, the appeal
a`m can be interpreted as the aggregate interest in selecting
to traverse link m upon exiting `.
In compact form, the set of dynamical equations (4) de-
scribing the routing parameters reads as follows:
r˙ = %(r, pi), (5)
where r = [. . . , r`m, . . . ]T, (`,m) ∈ A, denotes the joint
vector of routing ratios. In the following result, we show that
the congestion-responsive routing model (5) evolves within the
feasible set of routing ratios RG at all times.
Lemma 2.1: (Conservation of Flows) Let G be a traffic
network and let δ`m = δ` ∈ R>0 for all (`,m) ∈ A. If
r(0) ∈ RG , then the vector of routing ratios is feasible at all
times, that is,
r ∈ RG for all t ∈ R>0.
Proof: The proof of this claim is organized into two parts.
First, we show that r`m ∈ [0, 1]. To show that the routing ratios
are non-negative, r`m ≥ 0, we note that
r`m = 0⇒ r˙`m = r`ma`m(x) = 0.
To show that the routing ratios are upper bounded, r`m ≤ 1,
assume the ratio achieves the boundary, i.e. r`m = 1. Then,
since r ∈ RG (i.e.,
∑
q r`q = 1), we have
r`q = 0 for all q 6= m,
which implies
a`m(x) =
∑
q
r`qpiq − pim = r`mpim − pim = 0.
Hence, the above observations prove the following implication
r`m = 1⇒ r˙`m = r`ma`m(x) = 0,
which shows that the routing ratios are bounded in [0, 1].
Second, we prove that
∑
m r`m = 1. To this aim, we
equivalently show that
∑
m r˙`m = 0. By substituting the
expression (4) in the summation term we obtain∑
m
r˙`m =
∑
m
r`m(
∑
q
r`qpiq − pim)
=
∑
m
r`m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∑
q
r`qpiq −
∑
m
r`mpim
=
∑
q
r`qpiq −
∑
m
r`mpim = 0,
which shows the claim and concludes the proof.
We conclude this discussion by illustrating in Example 3
our routing model, by discussing in Remark 3 the use of the
replicator equation to model routing apps, and by clarifying
in Remark 4 the novelty of our framework with respect to the
classical routing game.
Example 3: (Dynamical Routing Model) Consider the
seven-link network illustrated in Fig. 1 and discussed in
Example 2. By assuming that the drivers perceive the global
cost to destination (3), the perceived costs read as
pi1 = τ1 + p¯iv1→d, p¯iv1→d = min{pi2, pi3},
pi2 = τ2 + p¯iv2→d, p¯iv2→d = min{pi4, pi5},
pi3 = τ3 + p¯iv3→d, p¯iv3→d = pi6,
pi4 = τ4 + p¯iv3→d,
pi5 = τ5 + p¯iv4→d, p¯iv4→d = pi7,
pi6 = τ6 + p¯iv4→d,
pi7 = τ7.
We note that the perceived costs (3) are defined in a recursive
way, where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, pii can be computed
given pii+1, . . . , pi7 . Moreover, the aggregate behavior of the
population at the nodes is described as in (4) by
r˙12 = r12((r12 − 1)pi2 + r13pi3),
r˙13 = r13((r13 − 1)pi3 + r12pi2),
r˙24 = r24((r24 − 1)pi4 + r25pi5),
r˙25 = r25((r25 − 1)pi5 + r24pi4).
Finally, we note that Lemma 2.1 ensures r12 + r13 = 1 and
r24 + r25 = 1 at all times. 
5Remark 3: (Modeling Aggregate Learning Through Repli-
cator Equation) The replicator equation was originally devel-
oped to study selection in biological evolution. However, it
was found recently in [18] (see also references therein) that the
evolutionary replicator dynamics can also arise from certain
models of human learning. Moreover, in a more recent work
[19] it was shown that if models of reinforcement learning
or other machine learning techniques were aggregated over
a large population, the resulting behavior would possess the
same qualitative properties as the replicator dynamics. 
Remark 4: (Relationship to Routing Game) A trend of
literature (e.g. see [10], [11]) recently combined the classical
routing game with evolutionary models in order to capture
dynamics in the path-selection mechanism of new drivers
entering the network. Although these works represent a sig-
nificant step towards understanding the dynamics of traffic
routing, they still critically rely on a static flow model, where
traffic flows instantaneously propagate across the network.
Unfortunately, this assumption lacks to capture the fact that
traffic conditions can change while travelers are traversing the
network, and that navigation apps will instantaneously respond
by updating the route of each driver at her next available
junction. To overcome these limitations, our framework (i)
leverages a dynamical traffic model that captures finite flow
propagation times, and (ii) includes a junction-based routing
model where travelers can update their routing behavior at
every node of the network in relationship to the current
congestion information. 
C. The Wardrop First Principle
The goal of this section is to establish a connection between
the classical game-theoretic setting and our framework. The
routing game [8] consists of a static (time-invariant) traffic
model combined with a path-selection model. In this decision
model, a new traveler entering the network selects a certain
origin-destination path based on the instantaneous traffic con-
gestion and, because the traffic model is static, drivers do not
update their path while they are traversing the network. Once
this path-selection mechanism terminates, the network is at
an equilibrium point known as the Wardrop Equilibrium, a
condition where all the used paths have identical travel time.
Next, we recall the notion Wardrop Equilibrium. To comply
with the static nature of the routing game, we will assume that
the dynamical system (7) is at an equilibrium point. Let x∗ be
an equilibrium of (2), and let
f∗` := f
out
` (x
∗
` ), ` ∈ L,
be the set of equilibrium flows on the links. In vector form,
f∗ := [f∗1 . . . , f
∗
n]
T. Moreover, let P = {p1, . . . , pζ}, ζ ∈ N,
be the set of simple paths between origin and destination, and
let f∗p := [f
∗
p1 , . . . , f
∗
pζ
]T be the set of flows on the paths. The
flows on the origin-destination paths are related to the flows
on the links by means of the following relationship:
f∗` =
∑
p∈P:`∈p
f∗p ,
which establishes that the flow on each link is the superposi-
tion of all the flows in the paths passing through that link. By
Traffic Dynamics
x˙ = (RT − I)f(x) + λ
Routing Dynamics
r˙ = ̺(π, r)
pi = pi(x)
T
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Fig. 2. Feedback interconnection between traffic and routing dynamics.
inverting the above set of equations, the vector of path flows
can be computed from the vector of link flows as follows
f∗p = E
†f∗, (6)
where E ∈ Rn×ν is the edge-path incidence matrix:
E`p =
{
1, if ` ∈ p,
0, otherwise,
where E† denotes the pseudoinverse of E. Lemma 2.2 shows
that the path flows are unique for any choice of link flows.
Lemma 2.2: (Uniqueness of the Path Flow Vectors) Let G
be acyclic. Then, for every vector of link flows f∗ ∈ Fn there
exists a unique vector of path flows f∗p ∈ Rζ that solves (6).
The proof of this lemma is postponed to the appendix.
We extend the definition of travel costs to the origin-
destination paths by letting the travel cost of a path be the
sum of the cost of all the links in that path, namely,
τ∗p := E
Tτ(x∗).
The Wardrop First Principle states that all paths with
nonzero flow have identical travel cost, and is formalized next.
Definition 1: (Wardrop First Principle) Let x∗ be an
equilibrium of (2). The vector x∗ is a Wardrop Equilibrium
if the following condition is satisfied for all origin-destination
paths p ∈ P:
f∗p (τ
∗
p − τ∗p¯ ) ≤ 0, for all p¯ ∈ P.
III. EXISTENCE AND PROPERTIES OF THE EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we characterize the properties of the fixed
points of dynamical traffic networks with app-informed rout-
ing. Formally, we are interested in characterizing the fixed
points of the feedback interconnection between the traffic
dynamics (2) and the routing dynamics (5), which reads as:
x˙ = (RT − I)f(x) + λ, pi = pi(x),
r˙ = %(r, pi). (7)
Fig. 2 graphically illustrates the interactions between the two
systems and depicts the quantities that establish the coupling.
6A. Restricted Set of Equilibria
Let (x∗, r∗) be a fixed point of (7). It follows from the
expressions of the routing model (4) that, for all pairs of
adjacent links (`,m) ∈ A, one of the following conditions
is satisfied at equilibrium:
a`m(x
∗) = 0, or r∗`m = 0.
We next show that a subset of these points is unstable.
Lemma 3.1: (Unstable Equilibria) Let (x∗, r∗) be a fixed
point of (7) and assume there exists (`,m) ∈ A such that
r∗`m = 0, and a`m(x
∗) > 0.
Then, (x∗, r∗) is unstable.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we adopt a perturbation
reasoning and show that there exists an infinitesimally-small
perturbation from the equilibrium such that r˙`m > 0. The
proof is organized into two main parts.
First, we show that at equilibrium all links alternative to
m have identical perceived cost. To this aim, we note that
r∗`m = 0 combined with r
∗ ∈ RG (i.e.
∑
q r
∗
`q = 1) implies
that there exists (at least) one alternative link w such that
r∗`w > 0. In general, letW = {w1, . . . , wξ}, ξ ∈ N, denote the
set of all such links. Since r∗`wi > 0 and x
∗ is an equilibrium,
we necessarily have a`wi(x
∗) = 0 or, equivalently,
0 = a`wi(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗wi ,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ξ}. The above system of equations admits
the explicit solution pi∗wi =
∑
q r
∗
`qpi
∗
q for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ξ},
which implies
pi∗wi = pi
∗
wj , for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , ξ}, (8)
and proves the first claim.
Second, we show that at equilibrium all links alternative to
m (i.e. links w ∈ W), have strictly suboptimal travel cost:
pi∗w > pi
∗
m. To this aim, we use the assumption a`m(x
∗) > 0
to obtain
0 < a`m(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m
= pi∗w
∑
q
r∗`q − pi∗m
= pi∗w − pi∗m, (9)
where we substituted (4) to obtain the first identity, and (8) to
obtain the second identity, which proves the second claim.
Finally, let  ∈ R>0 be a scalar perturbation. By perturbing
(4) from the equilibrium point, r∗`m 7→ r∗`m + , we have
r˙`m = (
∑
q 6=m,w
r∗`qpi
∗
q + (r
∗
`m + )pi
∗
m + (r
∗
`w − )pi∗w − pi∗m)
= (
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q + pi
∗
m − pi∗w − pi∗m)
= (pi∗w
∑
q
r∗`q︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+pi∗m − pi∗w − pi∗m)
= (pi∗w + pi
∗
m − pi∗w − pi∗m)
= (pi∗w − pi∗m)(1− ) > 0,
where we used (8) to obtain the third identity, and the final
inequality follows from (9) and from  > 0. The conclusion
follows by observing that infinitely-small perturbations → 0
result in systems that depart from the equilibria r˙`m > 0.
Lemma 2.1 shows that equilibrium points where at least
one of the links has a positive appeal function are unstable.
Such scenarios can be interpreted in practice as a situation
where there exists a link in the network with a preferable travel
time to destination (i.e. a`m > 0), but no driver is currently
traversing that road (i.e. r`m = 0). Hence, the navigation app
lacks of sufficient observations from other travelers to begin
routing vehicles towards that road, thus making the routing
algorithm ignore the availability of such option.
In order to disregard the unstable equilibria from the dis-
cussion, in the remainder we focus on the equilibria (x∗, r∗)
such that, for all (`,m) ∈ A, satisfy:
a`m(x
∗) = 0, or r`m = 0 and a`m(x∗) < 0. (10)
Remark 5: (Relationship to Game Dynamics) The set of
equilibria defined in (10) is often interpreted in the game-
theoretic literature as the set of Nash Equilibria of the game
dynamics (4) (see e.g. [20]). It is worth noting that Lemma 2.1
extends the available results in this line of literature (e.g. see
the Folk Theorem of evolutionary game theory [9] and the
specific conclusions drawn for the routing game by Fischer
and Vo¨cking [10]), by showing that the set of rest points that
are not Nash equilibria are unstable for replicator equations
where the payoffs do not depend directly from the strategy. 
B. Existence of Equilibria
Next, we characterize the existence of fixed points of the
interconnected system (7). Our result relies on the following
technical assumption.
(A3) The link travel costs are finite, namely, for all ` ∈ L
τ`(x`) <∞ if x` <∞.
Assumption (A3) disregards cases where travel times are
unbounded, and will be relaxed later in this section.
Next, we recall the graph-theoretic notion of min-cut ca-
pacity [21]. Let the set of nodes V be partitioned into two
subsets S ⊆ V and S¯ = V − S, such that the network
source s ∈ S and the network destination d ∈ S¯. Let
Sout = {(v, u) ∈ L : v ∈ S and u ∈ S¯} be a cut, namely,
the set of all links from S to S¯, and let CS =
∑
`∈Sout C` be
the capacity of the cut. The min-cut capacity is defined as
Cm-cut = minS
CS .
The following result relates the existence of fixed points to
the magnitude of the exogenous inflow to the network.
Theorem 3.2: (Existence of Equilibria) Let Assumptions
(A1)-(A3) be satisfied. The interconnected system (7) admits
an equilibrium point that satisfies (10) if and only if the
network inflow is no larger than the min-cut capacity:
λ¯ ≤ Cm-cut. (11)
Proof: (If) The proof is organized into two main parts.
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(x∗, r∗) that is an equilibrium point of the traffic dynamics
with finite perceived travel costs, that is,
(R∗T − I)f(x∗) + λ = 0, and pi(x∗) <∞.
To this aim, consider the graph G with associated inflow λ¯. By
application of the max-flow min-cut theorem [21], there exists
a feasible assignment of flows to the links of the graph G,
that is, a set of scalars {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
0 ≤ ϕ` ≤ C`, for all ` ∈ L,∑
`∈vin
ϕ` =
∑
`∈vout
ϕ`, for all v ∈ V,
ϕ1 = λ¯.
By choosing r∗`m := ϕm/ϕ` for all (`,m) ∈ A, the above
equations imply that
(R∗T − I)ϕ+ λ = 0,
where ϕ = [ϕ1 . . . , ϕn]T. Finally, by choosing x∗` so that
f out(x∗` ) = ϕ`, we have that (x
∗, r∗) is a fixed point of the
traffic dynamics (2), which proves the first claim.
Second, we show that for any traffic state x∗ ∈ X with finite
perceived costs, pi(x∗) < ∞, there exists a vector of feasible
routing ratios r∗ that is a fixed point of the routing dynamics
and satisfies (10). To this aim, we first consider a given link
` ∈ L and we prove the claim for the single junction equation
(4). The statement will then follow by iterating the reasoning
for all ` ∈ L. We distinguish among two cases.
(Case 1) For all pairs a, a¯ ∈ A`, where a = (`,m) and a¯ =
(`, m¯), the costs satisfy pim(x∗) = pim¯(x∗). In this case, the
following identity holds:
r˙∗`m = r
∗
`m(
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m)
= r∗`m(pi
∗
m
∑
q
r∗`q︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−pi∗m)
= r∗`m (pi
∗
m − pi∗m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a`m(x∗)
= 0,
which shows that r˙∗`m = 0 and a
∗
`m = 0, and proves that
(x∗, r∗) is an equilibrium point that satisfies (10).
(Case 2) There exists a, a¯ ∈ A`, where a = (`,m) and a¯ =
(`, m¯), such that the costs satisfy pim 6= pim¯. In this case, let
pim¯ = max
a=(`,m)∈A`
pim,
be the largest perceived cost at the junction. By letting r∗`m¯ = 1
and r∗`m = 0 for all m 6= m¯ we obtain the following identities
r˙∗`m¯ = r
∗
`m¯(
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m¯) = (pi∗m¯ − pi∗m¯) = 0,
r˙∗`m = r
∗
`m(
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m) = 0,
which shows that the provided choice of r∗ is a fixed point of
(4). Moreover, the above identities also imply
a`m¯(x
∗) = (pi∗m¯ − pi∗m¯) = 0,
a`m(x
∗) = (pi∗m¯ − pi∗m) > 0,
which shows that the equilibrium point satisfies (10).
The conclusion thus follows by combining the two parts
of the proof. In fact, when λ¯ ≤ Cm-cut the first part shows
that the traffic dynamics admit an equilibrium with finite
perceived costs for some choice of the routing. The second
part of the proof guarantees that the routing dynamics admit
an equilibrium for any traffic state with finite travel costs.
(Only if) The proof of this statement follows by adopting
a contradiction reasoning. To this aim, assume (x∗, r∗) is an
equilibrium point and that λ¯ > Cm-cut. The latter assumption,
combined with the Maximum Flow Theorem, implies that for
any assignment of flows to the links of the graph G there exists
` ∈ L such that ϕ` > C`. In other words, link ` is required to
transfer a traffic flow f in` (x
∗) = ϕ`, and thus:
x˙` = f
in
` (x
∗)− f out` (x∗` )
= ϕ` − f out` (x∗` )
≥ ϕ` − C` > 0,
which shows shows that x` grows unbounded, and hence
contradicts the assumption that (x∗, r∗) is an equilibrium.
The above theorem bridges an interesting gap between the
behavior of dynamical systems and graph-theoretic notions.
In fact, it relates the properties of the equilibrium points of a
dynamical system with the notion of minimum-cut capacity,
which is a feature of static graphs. Two important implica-
tions follow from Theorem 3.2. First, by recalling that the
minimum-cut capacity equals the maximum flow through a
graph (see Maximum-Flow Theorem [21]), the result shows
that a dynamical traffic network admits an equilibrium point
that transfers a traffic demand equal to the maximum flow. This
observation demonstrates that routing apps not only optimize
the travelers’ commute, but also have a benefit at the system-
level. Second, the result shows that when the traffic demand
is too large (λ¯ > Cm-cut), then the network does not admit any
equilibrium point, in fact, it operates at a condition in which
traffic densities in the links grow unbounded.
We conclude this section by discussing a special technical
assumption that can be used to capture back propagation of
traffic congestion, a scenario that is particularly relevant in
practice. To this aim, we introduce the following assumption.
(A4) For all ` ∈ L, the travel cost becomes unbounded when
` reaches its flow capacity, namely,
τ`(x`) =∞ for all x` such that f out` (x`) = C`.
Assumption (A4) states that if a link is approaching its max-
imum flow capacity, then the travelers will increasingly avoid
it. This setting can also be used to capture back propagation,
where if the density of a link reaches a critical value then
no additional vehicles can enter that link (cf. Remark 1). The
following corollary refines Theorem 3.2 for unbounded costs.
Corollary 3.3: Let Assumption (A4) replace (A3) in Theo-
rem 3.2. The interconnected system (7) admits an equilibrium
8point that satisfies (10) if and only if the network inflow is
strictly lower than the min-cut capacity:
λ¯ < Cm-cut.
C. Relationship to Wardrop Equilibrium
The following result relates the fixed points of the dynamical
system (7) with the established notion of Wardrop equilibria.
Theorem 3.4: (Relationship Between Fixed Points and
Wardrop Equilibria) Consider the interconnected system (7).
The following statements are equivalent:
(i) x∗ ∈ X satisfies the Wardrop First Principle;
(ii) The pair (x∗, r∗) is a fixed point of (7) for some r∗ ∈
RG . Moreover, (x∗, r∗) satisfies (10).
Proof: (i)⇒ (ii) We begin by observing that, by assump-
tion, a Wardrop equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the traffic
dynamics (2). Thus, we next prove that given a vector x∗ that
satisfies the Wardrop conditions, there exists a vector r∗ ∈ RG
such that (10) is satisfied.
Since the graph is acyclic, it admits a shortest path spanning
tree [21], that is, a directed tree rooted from the source with
the property that the unique path from the source to any node
is a shortest path to that node. Notice that, since in general the
Wardrop First Principle allows the existence of multiple paths
with optimal travel costs, the shortest-path spanning tree is
typically not unique. Next, we distinguish among three cases.
(Case 1) For all p, p¯ ∈ P , τ∗p − τ∗p¯ = 0, namely, all origin-
destination paths have identical travel time. This assumption
implies that for every node v ∈ V all its outgoing links belong
to one of the shortest-path spanning trees. This observation,
combined with the fact that the perceived costs are equal to
the shorthest travel cost to destination, implies that
pi∗q = pi
∗
m, for all pairs m, q ∈ vout.
As a result,
a`m(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m = pi∗m(
∑
q
r∗`q − 1) = 0.
By iterating the above equation for all (`,m) ∈ A we proved
that the first condition in (10) is satisfied.
(Case 2) There exists a unique p ∈ P such that f∗p = 0 and
for all p¯ 6= p, τ∗p¯ − τ∗p ≤ 0, namely, the path p has suboptimal
travel time to destination. This assumption implies that there
exists a certain node in the network v ∈ V such that one of its
outgoing links m ∈ vout belongs to p (i.e., it does not belong
to any shortest-path spanning tree), while q ∈ vout belongs to
some p¯ (i.e., it belongs to a shortest path spanning tree). This
observation, combined with the fact that the perceived costs
are equal to the shorthest travel cost to destination, implies
pi∗m > pi
∗
q .
Moreover, since m belongs to an origin-destination path with
zero flow, there exists ` ∈ vin such that r∗`m = 0, and thus
a`m(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m
=
∑
q 6=m
r∗`qpi
∗
q + r
∗
`m︸︷︷︸
=0
pi∗m − pi∗m
=
∑
q 6=m
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m
= pi∗q
∑
q 6=m
r∗`q − pi∗m
= pi∗q − pi∗m < 0, (12)
which proves that a`m(x∗) < 0, and shows that the second
condition in (10) is satisfied for the pair (`,m) ∈ A.
(Case 3) There exists multiple p ∈ P such that f∗p = 0 and
for some p¯ 6= p, τ∗p¯ − τ∗p ≤ 0, namely, there exists multiple
origin-destination paths with suboptimal travel cost. Under this
assumption, we note that the bound derived in (12) can be
iterated for all links m such that r∗`m = 0, which shows that
the second condition in (10) is satisfied for all these pairs, and
concludes the proof of the implication.
(ii)⇒ (i) To prove this implication we consider three cases.
(Case 1) For all (`,m) ∈ A, a`m(x∗) = 0, namely, all links
have identically zero appeal. Under this assumption, for every
` ∈ L, all the perceived travel costs satisfy
0 = a`m(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m, for all m ∈ A`, (13)
which implies that pi∗m = pi
∗
m¯ for all m, m¯ ∈ A` are identical
(i.e. pi∗m = pi
∗
m¯ =
∑
q r
∗
`qpi
∗
q ). This observation, combined with
the fact that the perceived costs are equal to the shorthest
travel cost to destination, implies that every link in the network
belongs to a shortest path to destination. Hence, all origin-
destination paths have identical travel cost, i.e. τ∗p − τ∗p¯ = 0,
which shows that x∗ satisfies the Wardrop First Principle.
(Case 2) There exists a unique (`,m) ∈ A such that
a`m(x
∗) < 0 and r`m = 0. Under this assumption, we first
prove that there exists a path p ∈ P containing link m such
that f∗p = 0. Since the flow on any origin-destination path can
be written as the network inflow multiplied by the product of
the routing ratios belonging to that path:
f∗p = λ¯
∏
q,w∈p
r∗qw,
we immediately obtain f∗p = 0.
Second, we prove that for all p¯ ∈ P , p¯ 6= p, the following
inequality holds: τ∗p¯ − τ∗p ≤ 0. By using the assumption
a`m(x
∗) < 0, together with pi∗w =
∑
q r
∗
`qpi
∗
q , which holds
for all w ∈ A`, w 6= m, (see (13)), we have
0 > a`m(x
∗) =
∑
q
r∗`qpi
∗
q − pi∗m
= pi∗w
∑
q
r∗`q − pi∗m
= pi∗w − pi∗m. (14)
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Fig. 3. Two-link network (a), and piecewise affine outflow function (b).
Since path p contains link w and the minimum travel cost
from w to destination is suboptimal (pi∗w > pi
∗
m), we have that
any path p¯ ∈ P containing link m satisfies
τ∗p¯ < τ
∗
p ,
which shows that x∗ satisfies the Wardrop First Principle.
(Case 3) There exists multiple ramps (`,m) ∈ A such that
a`m(x
∗) < 0 and r∗`m = 0. Under this assumption, we note
that equation (14) still applies because r∗`m = 0. Hence, the
reasoning adopted for (Case 2) can be iterated for all (`,m)
such that a`m(x∗) < 0 and r∗`m = 0.
Three important implications follow from the above theo-
rem. First, the result shows that a Wardrop equilibrium is also
an equilibrium of the dynamical model (7), thus showing that if
a dynamical network starts at a Wardrop equilibrium it will re-
main at that equilibrium at all times. Second, the result shows
that dynamical systems in which travelers update their routing
in real-time at every junction by minimizing their perceived
travel cost admit equilibrium points that satisfy the Wardrop
conditions. This observation supports our modeling choices,
and demonstrates that the perceived costs are representative
quantities to describe the economical decisions of routing apps.
Third, by combining Theorem 3.4 with (10), it follows that a
Wardrop Equilibrium is perceived by the travelers when all
the network links have a nonpositive appeal function. This
condition corresponds to a situation where at every junction
no link is more appealing that others.
IV. STABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we characterize the stability of the fixed
points of the feedback interconnection (7). Our main findings
are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1: (Stability of Interconnected Traffic Dy-
namics) Let (x∗, r∗) be a fixed point of (7) satisfying the
conditions (10). Then, (x∗, r∗) is stable.
The proof of this theorem is postponed to later in this section.
The simple stability of the fixed points implies that the state
trajectories are not guaranteed to decay asymptotically towards
the equilibrium points, and can result in nontrivial behaviors,
such as oscillations, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 4: (Existence of Oscillations in Two Parallel
Roads) Consider the network illustrated in Fig. 3(a), represent-
ing two parallel roads subject to a constant inflow of vehicles
λ¯ ∈ R>0. We assume that the travel costs are linear
τ`(x`) = x`,
and that all outflows are identical and piecewise-affine:
f out` (x`) = min{vx`, C},
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Fig. 4. Phase portrait: (a) oscillatory trajectories, (b) stable trajectories. The
red curve illustrates an example of trajectories passing through the conditions
x3 = x2 and r12 = 0.9.
for all ` ∈ L = {1, . . . , 4}, where v ∈ R>0.
We distinguish among two cases: (a) the network is operat-
ing in congested regimes, that is, at all times x1 > C/v and
x2 > C/v, and (b) the network is operating in regimes of
free-flow, that is, at all times x1 ≤ C/v and x2 ≤ C/v. Fig. 4
(a) and (b) show the phase portrait of the system trajectories
in case (a) and case (b), respectively. As illustrated by the
plots: in case (a) the trajectories of the system are oscillating
periodic orbits; in contrast, in case (b) the trajectories con-
verge asymptotically to an equilibrium point. The presence of
periodic orbits implies that the equilibrium points are stable,
but not asymptotically stable, thus supporting Theorem 4.1.
The existence of periodic orbits in case (a) can be further
formalized. To this aim, we recall the dynamical equations
governing the system in this regime:
x˙2 = −C + r12λ¯,
x˙3 = −C + r13λ¯,
r˙12 = r12(1− r12)(x3 − x2),
where we used the fact that f out1 = λ¯ after an initial transient.
This system admits an equilibrium point described by r12 =
0.5 and x3 = x2. We adopt the change of variables z :=
x3 − x2, and rewrite the dynamical equations describing the
new state [z, r12]T:
z˙ = (1− 2r12)λ¯,
r˙12 = r12(1− r12)z.
Next, we show that the following quantity:
U(z, r12) :=
1
2
z2 − λ¯ (ln r12 − ln(1− r12)) ,
is conserved along the trajectories of the system. To this aim,
we compute its time derivative to obtain
U˙(z, r12) = zz˙ − λ¯
(
1
r12
+
1
1− r12
)
r˙12
= z(1− 2r12)λ¯− λ¯((1− r12)z − r12z))
= z(1− 2r12)λ¯− z(1− 2r12)λ¯ = 0,
which shows that the quantity U(z, r12) is a constant of
motion, and proves the existence of periodic orbits. 
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In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the key
technical results that prove Theorem 4.1. In short, the sta-
bility of the fixed points of (7) follows from interpreting the
system as a negative feedback interconnection between the
traffic dynamics and the routing dynamics (see Fig. 2), and
from showing that each open-loop component is a passive
dynamical system. We refer to Appendix A-B for a summary
of the notions of passivity utilized in the remainder.
We next show that the routing dynamics satisfy the passivity
property. To this aim, we first prove that the group of routing
equations at a single junction are passive. For every link ` ∈ L,
recall that A` is the set of links available at the downstream
junction, and let |A`| := α be its cardinality. We interpret the
set of α dynamical equations
r˙`m = r`m(
∑
q
r`qpiq − pim), for all m ∈ A`, (15)
as a dynamical system with input and output, respectively,
u` = [pim1 , . . . , pimα ]
T,
y` = [r`m1 , . . . , r`mα ]
T. (16)
The following result formalizes the passivity of equations (15).
Lemma 4.2: (Passivity of Single-Junction Routing Dynam-
ics) The single-junction routing dynamics (15) is passive with
respect to the input-output pair (−u`, y`).
Proof: We let [r∗`m1 , . . . , r
∗
`mp
] denote a fixed point of
(15), and we show that
V`(r) =
∑
m∈A`
r∗`m ln
(
r∗`m
r`m
)
, (17)
is a storage function for the dynamical system defined by (15).
We begin by observing that V` is differentiable because it is a
linear combination of natural logarithm functions. Moreover,
by using the log-sum inequality, we have
V`(r) =
∑
m
r∗`m ln
(
r∗`m
r`m
)
≥
∑
m
r∗`m ln
(∑
m r
∗
`m∑
m r`m
)
= ln(1) = 0,
where we used the fact that
∑
m r
∗
`m =
∑
m r`m = 1, which
shows that V` is an appropriate choice of storage function.
To show the passivity property, we first incorporate the
negative sign of the input vector into the dynamical equation,
and we rewrite (15) as
r˙`m = r`m(pim −
∑
q
r`qpiq), for all m ∈ A`,
and we next show passivity of the above equation with respect
to the input-output pair (u`, y`). The derivative of the storage
function is
V˙`(r) = −
∑
m
r∗`m
r˙`m
r`m
= −
∑
m
r∗`m(pim −
∑
q
r`qpiq)
= −
∑
m
r∗`mpim +
∑
m
r∗`m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∑
q
r`qpiq
= −
∑
m
r∗`mpim +
∑
q
r`qpiq
≤
∑
q
r`qpiq = u
T
` y`,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that r`q ≥ 0 and
piq ≥ 0, which shows the claim and concludes the proof.
Next, we leverage the above lemma to show that the overall
routing dynamics (5) also satisfy the passivity property. To this
aim, we consider (5) as a dynamical system with input and
output vectors, respectively,
ur = [u`1 , . . . , u`n ]
T,
yr = [y`1 , . . . , y`n ]
T, (18)
where u`i and y`i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are defined in (16).
Passivity of the overall routing dynamics is formalized next.
Lemma 4.3: (Passivity of Overall Routing Dynamics) Let
the perceived travel costs be modeled as in (3). Then, the
overall routing dynamics (5) is passive with respect to the
input-output pair (−ur, yr).
Proof: The proof of this statement consists of two parts.
First, we show that the dynamical equations at every pair
of junctions are independent, and thus the overall routing
dynamics (5) can be studied as a composition of independent
subsystems. To this aim, we will show that u` is independent
of ym in (16), for all ` 6= m. This fact immediately follows
by observing that, when the perceived travel costs follow the
model (3), the perceived cost pi`(x) is a function that only
depends on x, and it is independent of the routing r.
Second, we show that passivity of all the individual junc-
tions implies passivity of the overall routing dynamics (5). To
this aim, we consider the following storage function for (5):
Vr(r) =
∑
`∈L
V`(r), (19)
where V` denotes the storage function associated to junction
`. By taking the time derivative of the above storage function:
V˙r(r) =
∑
`∈L
V˙`(r) ≤
∑
`∈L
uT` y` = u
T
r yr,
where the inequality follows from the passivity of the individ-
ual junctions, which proves the passivity of (5).
Next, we show that the traffic dynamics (2) satisfy the
passivity property. To this aim, we interpret (2) as an input-
output dynamical system with input described by the set of
routing ratios, and output described by the set of perceived
link costs. Formally, to the scalar input r`m we associate the
scalar output pim or, equivalently, in vector form we consider
the following input and output vectors:
ux = [r11, r12, . . . , r1n, r21, . . . , rnn]
T,
yx = [ pi1, pi2, . . . , pin, pi1, . . . , pin]. (20)
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The following result formalizes the passivity of (2).
Lemma 4.4: (Passivity of the Traffic Dynamics) Assume
that all links ` ∈ L have finite flow capacity C` < ∞. Then,
the traffic network (2) is a passive dynamical system with
respect to the input-output pair (ux, yx).
Moreover, if for all ` there exists ρ` ∈ R>0 such that
f`(x`) ≥ ρ`pi`(x`), (21)
then the traffic dynamics (2) are output strictly passive.
Proof: We show that the following function
Vx(x) =
1
h
∑
`∈L
∫ x`
0
pi`(σ) dσ, (22)
is a storage function for (2), where the constant h ∈ R>0 is
chosen as follows:
h = max
`∈L
C`.
We note that Vx is non-negative and it is differentiable, because
it is the combination of integral functions, and thus it is an
appropriate choice of storage function. By taking the time
derivative of the storage function we obtain
V˙x(x) =
1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)x˙`
=
1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)
(
−f out` (x`) +
∑
m∈A`
rm`f
out
m (xm)
)
= − 1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)f
out
` (x`)
+
1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)
∑
m∈A`
rm`f
out
m (xm)
≤ 1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)
∑
m∈A`
rm`f
out
m (xm)
≤
∑
`∈L
∑
m∈A`
pi`(x`)rm` = u
T
xyx,
where for the first inequality we used the fact that
pi`(x`)f`(x`) ≥ 0 for all ` ∈ L, and the last inequality follows
from the above choice of h (which implies fm/h < 1, for all
m ∈ L). Hence, the bound proves the passivity of (2).
To show output-strict passivity, we substitute the inequality
(21) into the time-derivative of the storage function to obtain:
V˙x(x) = − 1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)f
out
` (x`)
+
1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)
∑
m∈A`
rm`f
out
m (xm)
≤ − 1
h
∑
`∈L
ρ`pi`(x`)
2 +
1
h
∑
`∈L
pi`(x`)
∑
m∈A`
rm`f
out
m (xm)
≤ −
∑
`∈L
ρ`pi`(x`)
2 +
∑
`∈L
∑
m∈A`
pi`(x`)rm`
≤ −yTxyx + uTxyx,
where the last inequality follows from ρ` > 0, which shows
that (2) is output strictly passive and concludes the proof.
The additional assumption (21) needed to ensure output
strict passivity can be interpreted as follows. By using the
fact that for every x` ∈ X , pi`(x`) > 0, the inequality (21)
can be rewritten as follows:
f`(x`)
pi`(x`)
≥ ρ`,
and, by deriving both quantities with respect to x` we obtain
df`(x`)
dpi`(x`)
> 0,
where we used the fact that ρ` > 0. Hence, in order to achieve
output strict passivity, an increase in travel cost of a link must
imply an increase in traffic flow in the link.
We are now ready to formally prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: To prove the stability of the fixed
points, we interpret (7) as a negative feedback interconnection
between the traffic dynamics and the routing dynamics, and
we leverage the Passivity Theorem [15] to infer the Lyapunov
stability of the system. We refer to Theorem A.1 in Appendix
A-B for a concise statement of the Passivity Theorem.
We begin by observing that the lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 ensure
passivity of the open loop systems. Next, we show that the
equilibrium points are local minima for the storage function
of routing (19) and for the storage function of traffic (22).
First, we observe that the routing storage function Vr(r) in
(19) is the summation of the storage functions at the junctions
(17), which are non-negative quantities that are identically zero
at the equilibrium points V`(r∗) = 0. Hence, the equilibrium
points are local minima of the function Vr(r).
Second, we show that Vx(x) attains a minimum at the
equilibrium points. To this aim, we first let λ¯ = 0 and we
study the equilibrium points of (2). Every equilibrium point
x∗ satisfies the following identity
0 = (RT − I)f(x∗).
By observing that (RT−I) is invertible (see e.g. [17, Theorem
1]), and that f(x∗) = 0 only if x∗ = 0 (see Assumption (A1)),
the above equation implies that the unique equilibrium point
of the system satisfies x∗ = 0. The choice of Vx(x) in (22)
implies that Vx(x) is non-negative and that Vx(x∗) = 0, which
shows that x∗ is a local minima of the storage function. Lastly,
we observe that any nonzero λ¯ has the effect of shifting the
equilibrium point, and thus it does not change the properties
of the storage function.
Finally, the stability of the equilibrium points follows by
application of condition (i) in Theorem A.1. 
V. ROBUST INFORMATION DESIGN
In this section, we propose a control technique to guaran-
tee the asymptotic stability the equilibrium points, and thus
strengthen the robustness of the system. The method relies on
regulating the rate at which travelers react to congestion by
properly modifying the reaction rates. To this aim, we next
introduce the notion of congestion-aware reaction rates.
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Definition 2: (Congestion-Aware Reaction Rates) A set of
reaction rates for the dynamics (5) is congestion-aware if, for
all ` ∈ L,
δ` : T n → (0,+∞).
Moreover, let T` := {pim}m∈A` ⊆ T n be the set of per-
ceived costs at the links downstream of `. A set of congestion-
aware reaction rates is local if, for all ` ∈ L,
δ` : T` → (0,+∞). (23)

The class of congestion-aware reaction rates conceptualizes a
setting where the rate at which travelers react to changes in
traffic congestion is a function of the instantaneous perceived
costs. We observe that this control scheme can be achieved,
for instance, by appropriately designing the rate at which
navigation apps update their routing suggestions. Similarly,
local congestion-aware reaction rates model a setting where,
at every node of the network, the reaction rates at the incoming
links only depend on the perceived costs at the outgoing links.
We observe that the adoption of congestion-aware reactions
does not alter the equilibrium points of the interconnected
system (7). In fact, reaction rates are positive multiplicative
quantities in the dynamical equation (4), and thus the proper-
ties of the equilibrium points discussed in Section III remain
unchanged. The following result characterizes the stability of
the equilibrium points under congestion-aware reaction rates.
Theorem 5.1: (Asymptotic Stability Under Congestion-
Aware Reaction Rates) Consider the interconnected system
(7) where the routing dynamics adopt the class of local
congestion-aware reaction rates (23). Moreover, assume that
for every link ` ∈ L there exists a scalar ρ` ∈ R>0 such that
f`(x`) ≥ ρ`pi`(x`).
Then, every equilibrium point (x∗, r∗) that satisfies (10) is
asymptotically stable.
The proof of this theorem is postponed to later in this section.
The above theorem shows that the class of local congestion-
aware reaction rates ensures the asymptotic stability of the
equilibrium points of the interconnected traffic-routing system.
The result has an important practical interpretation that we
illustrate next. Let p = ({v1, . . . , vk}, {`1, . . . , `k}) be an
origin-destination path in the graph, that is, `1 = s and `k = d.
It follows from the recursive definition of perceived costs (3)
that the perceived costs are non-increasing along a path, that
is, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
pi`i ≥ pi`i+1 .
By combining this observation with the definition of local
reactions (23), it follows that the magnitude of the reaction
rates is non-increasing along a path, that is,
δ`i ≥ δ`i+1 .
Hence, Theorem 5.1 states that in order to achieve asymptotic
stability of the equilibrium points, travelers that are closer
to the network origin must react faster to changes in traffic
congestion as compared to travelers that are in the proximity
of the network destination.
In the remainder of this section, we present the key technical
results that formally prove Theorem 5.1. Loosely speaking,
the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium points follows
by ensuring that the open loop components of the negative
feedback interconnection (7) satisfy a strong passivity notion.
We begin by proving this property for the routing dynamics.
Lemma 5.2: (Input Strict Passivity of Routing Dynamics)
Assume the routing dynamics (5) adopt the class of local
congestion-aware reaction rates (23). Then, the overall routing
dynamics (5) is input strictly passive.
Proof: The proof of this statement consists of two parts.
First, we show that the single-junction routing dynamics (15)
are input strictly passive. To this aim, similarly to the proof
of Lemma 4.2, we reverse the sign of the dynamical equation
to take into account the negative sign in the input. Moreover,
we consider the following storage function
V`(r) =
1
h
∑
m∈A`
r∗`m ln
(
r∗`m
r`m
)
,
where [r∗`m1 , . . . , r
∗
`mp
] is a fixed point of (15), and the scalar
h` > 0 is chosen so that
h = max
`∈L
δ`.
We observe (23) implies h <∞, and that V`(r) is an appro-
priate choice of storage function (see proof of Lemma 4.2).
By computing the time derivative of the storage we obtain
V˙`(r) = − 1
h
∑
m
r∗`m
r˙`m
r`m
= − 1
h
∑
m
r∗`m(pim −
∑
q
r`qpiq)δ`
= − 1
h
∑
m
r∗`mpimδ` +
1
h
∑
m
r∗`m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∑
q
r`qpiqδ`
= − 1
h
∑
m
r∗`mpimδ` +
1
h
∑
q
r`qpiqδ`
= − 1
h
∑
m
r∗`mpimδ˜m(pim) +
1
h
∑
q
r`qpiqδ`
≤ −
∑
m
pimδ˜m(pim) +
∑
q
r`qpiq
= −uT` ϕ(u`) + uT` y`,
where for the fourth identity we used the fact that δ` is a
function of pim, namely, δ` = δ˜m(pim), the inequality follows
from our choice of h (which implies δ`/h < 1), and ϕ(u`) =
[δ˜m1(pim1), . . . , δ˜mp(pimp)]
T. The above inequality shows that
the single-junction routing (15) is input strictly passive.
Finally, input strict passivity of the overall routing dy-
namics follows by combining input strict passivity of the
junction dynamics with the choice of storage function Vr(r) =∑
`∈L V`(r) for (5), and by adopting a reasoning similar to the
one used in the proof of Lemma 4.3.
We are now ready to formally prove Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: To prove the asymptotic stability
of the fixed points, interpret (7) as a negative feedback
interconnection between the traffic dynamics and the routing
dynamics, and we leverage the stronger version of the Passivity
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Theorem [15] for Lyapunov stability. We refer to condition (ii)
of Theorem A.1 in Appendix A-B for a concise description of
the assumptions required to prove this result.
The proof of this claim is organized into three main parts,
and leverages the fact that the open loop components are
passive dynamical systems with storage functions defined in
the proofs of lemmas 4.4 and 5.2. First, we observe that
Theorem 4.1 immediately implies that the equilibrium points
are local minima for the storage functions.
Second, we show that each open loop systems is zero-
state detectable [15]. Zero-state detectability of the routing
dynamics immediately follows from the choice of input and
output (16), and by observing that the state of the system
coincides with its output. Zero-state detectability of the traffic
dynamics immediately follows from the choice of input and
output (20), and by observing that if the output of the system
is identically zero then its state is identically zero.
Third, we show that the inequalities (25) are satisfied. We
begin by observing that input strict passivity of the routing
dynamics, proved in Lemma 5.2, ensures the existence of a
function ϕrouting : T → Rn>0, such that
vTϕrouting(v) > 0, for all v 6= 0.
Moreover, output strict passivity of the traffic dynamics,
proved in Lemma 4.4, ensures the existence of a function
ρtraffic : T → Rn>0, such that
vTρtraffic(v) > 0, for all v 6= 0.
Finally, the statement of the result follows by combining
the above observations, and by application of condition (ii) in
the passivity theorem A.1. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents two sets of numerical simulations that
illustrate our findings.
A. Data From SR60-W and I10-W in Southern California
Consider the traffic network in Fig. 5(a), which schematizes
the west bounds of the freeways SR60-W and I10-W in
Southern California. Let x60 and x10 be the average traffic
density in the examined sections of SR60-W (absolute miles
13.1 − 22.4) and in the section of I10-W (absolute miles
24.4 − 36.02), respectively. Moreover, let r60 (resp. r10 =
1 − r60) be the fraction of travelers choosing freeway SR60-
W over I10-W (resp. choosing freeway I10-W over SR60-W)
for their commute. Fig. 5(b) illustrates the time-evolution of
the recorded traffic density1 for the two freeways on Friday,
March 6, 2020. The figure also illustrates an estimation of
the densities and of the routing fraction as predicted by our
models, demonstrating that our dynamical framework can
predict the complex dynamical behaviors observed in practice.
1Source: Caltrans Freeway Performance Measurement System (PeMS).
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Fig. 5. Time series data for SR60-W and I10-W on March 6, 2020. (a)
schematic of traffic network. (b) Sensory data (continuous lines with circles)
and trajectories predicted by our models (continuous lines). (c) Routing
predicted by our models. Simulation uses constant inflow λ¯ = 3340 veh/hr/ln.
B. Oscillating Trajectories in Seven-Link Network
Consider the seven-link network discussed in Example 2
and reported in Fig. 6(a), assume that the outflows are linear
f`(xi) = xi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 7},
and that the travel costs are affine:
τ`(x`) = a`x` + b`, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 7},
where the parameters a` and b` are summarized in Table I.
Since the flow capacities of the links are unbounded, Theorem
3.2 ensures the existence of an equilibrium point (x∗, r∗). It
can be verified that an equilibrium point that satisfies (10) is:
x∗1 = 6, x
∗
2 = 4, x
∗
3 = 2, x
∗
4 = 2, x
∗
5 = 2, x
∗
6 = 4, x
∗
7 = 6,
r12 = 2/3, r13 = 1/3, r24 = 1/2, r25 = 1/2.
Fig. 6 shows an example of trajectories, demonstrating that
the system admits a periodic orbit, which prevents the state
from converging to the equilibrium points asymptotically.
Fig. 7 shows the trajectories of the same network when
the routing apps use a set of local congestion-aware reaction
rates, demonstrating that this class of control policies ensures
the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium points.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a dynamical routing model to under-
stand the impact of app-informed travelers in traffic networks.
We studied the stability of the routing model coupled with
a dynamical traffic model, and we showed that the general
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TABLE I
CHOICE OF AFFINE TRAVEL COSTS
` 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a` 1 10 1 1 1 10 1
b` 0 0 50 10 50 0 0
2λ¯
1
3
4
6
75
(a)
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
(b)
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
(c)
0 10 20 30
0
.5
1
(d)
0 10 20 30
0
.5
1
(e)
Fig. 6. (a) Seven-link network. (b)-(c) Oscillating traffic state. (d)-(e)
Oscillating routing state.
adoption of routing apps (i) maximizes the throughput of flow
across the traffic system, but (ii) can deteriorate the stability
of the equilibrium points. To ensure asymptotic stability, we
propose a control technique that relies on regulating the rate
at which routing apps react to changes in traffic congestion.
Our results give rise to several opportunities for future work.
By coupling these models with common infrastructure-control
models (such as variable speed limits and freeway metering),
these results may play an important role in designing dynami-
cal controllers for congested infrastructures. Furthermore, our
models and stability analysis represent a fundamental frame-
work for future studies on robustness and security analysis.
APPENDIX A
A. Fixed Points and Stability of Systems With Inputs
In this brief section, we gather some basic concepts on
equilibria and stability of nonlinear dynamical systems.
Definition 3: (Fixed Points and Lyapunov Stability)
• A pair (x∗, r∗) and an input λ∗ > 0 are a fixed point
(or equilibrium point) of the dynamics (7) if, for initial
conditions x(0) = x∗, r(0) = r∗, and constant input
λ¯ = λ∗,
(R− I)f(x∗) + λ = 0, and %(r∗, pi(x∗)) = 0.
• A fixed point is stable if, for every x > 0, r > 0, there
exists δx > 0, δr > 0, such that
‖x(0)− x∗‖ < δx and ‖r(0)− r∗‖ < δr
⇒ ‖x(t)− x∗‖ < x and ‖r(t)− r∗‖ < r,
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Fig. 7. Asymptotic stability under congestion-aware reaction rates.
for all t ≥ 0.
• A fixed point is asymptotically stable if it is stable and
lim
t→+∞x(t) = x
∗ and lim
t→+∞ r(t) = r
∗.
• A fixed point is unstable if it is not stable. 
B. Passivity of Nonlinear Systems
In this section, we recall basic definitions and results on
passive nonlinear dynamical systems that are instrumental for
the analysis presented in this paper. We begin by recalling the
definition of passivity.
Definition 4: (Passive System [15])
• A dynamical system x˙ = f(x, u), y = g(x, u), x ∈ X ⊆
Rn, u ∈ U ⊆ Rm, y ∈ Y ⊆ Rp, is passive with respect to
the input-output pair (u, y) if there exists a differentiable
function V : X → R≥0, called the storage function, such
that for all initial conditions x(0) = x0 ∈ X , for all
allowed input functions u ∈ U , and t ≥ 0, the following
inequality holds
V (x(t))− V (x0) ≤
∫ t
0
u(σ)Ty(σ)dσ. (24)
• A dynamical system is input strictly passive if there exists
a function ϕ : U → Rm>0 such that uTϕ(u) > 0 for all
u 6= 0 and
V (x(t))− V (x0) ≤
∫ t
0
u(σ)Ty(σ)− u(σ)Tϕ(u(σ)) dσ.
• A dynamical system is output strictly passive if there
exists a function ρ : Y → Rp>0 such that yTρ(y) > 0 for
all y 6= 0 and
V (x(t))− V (x0) ≤
∫ t
0
u(σ)Ty(σ)− y(σ)Tρ(y(σ)) dσ.

Loosely speaking, a system is passive if the increase in its
storage function in the time interval [0, t] (left hand side of
(24)) is no larger than the energy supplied to the system during
that interval (right hand side of (24)). Passivity is a useful tool
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to assess the Lyapunov stability of a feedback interconnection.
The Passivity Theorem [15, Proposition 4.3.1], [22, Theorem
2.30] is summarized next.
Theorem A.1: (Passivity Theorem) Consider the systems
x˙i = f(xi, ui),
yi = gi(xi, ui), i ∈ {1, 2},
where xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Rn, ui ∈ Ui ⊆ Rm, yi ∈ Yi ⊆ Rm, and
assume the two systems are coupled by means of a negative
feedback interconnection, namely u2 = y1, u1 = −y2. More-
over, assume each system is passive with storage functions
Vi : Xi → R≥0. Then,
(i) if V1, V2 have strict local minimum at x∗1, x
∗
2, then
(x∗1, x
∗
2) is a stable fixed point of the negative feedback
interconnection.
(ii) Assume V1, V2 have strict local minimum at x∗1, x
∗
2.
Moreover, assume each system is zero-state detectable
and input-strictly passive or output strictly passive,
namely, each system admits a storage function that
satisfies
Vi(x(t))− Vi(x0) ≤
∫ t
0
ui(σ)
Tyi(σ)−
ui(σ)
Tϕi(ui(σ))− yi(σ)Tρi(yi(σ)) dσ.
for (possibly zero) functions ϕi : Ui → Rm≥0 and ρi :
Ui → Rm≥0. If
vTϕ1(v) + v
Tρ2(v) > 0, and
vTϕ2(v) + v
Tρ1(v) > 0, (25)
for all v 6= 0, then (x∗1, x∗2) is an asymptotically stable
fixed point of the negative feedback interconnection.
C. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.2: We equivalently show that the linear
map f∗ = Ef∗p is injective, that is, Ker(E) = ∅. By using the
fact that E is a n×ζ matrix, we will show that the columns of
E are linearly independent, that is, Rank(E) = ζ. We organize
the proof into two parts. First, we show that ζ ≤ n. Second,
we prove that E contains ζ linearly independent columns.
To show that ζ ≤ n, we let S ⊆ V and we partition V into
two subsets, S and S¯ = V − S, such that s ∈ S and d ∈ S¯.
Moreover, we let Sout = {(vi, vj) ∈ L : vj ∈ S and vi ∈ S¯}
be the set of all links from S to S¯ . By application of the Max-
Flow Theorem [21], the number of simple paths ζ satisfies
ζ = min
S⊆V
|Sout|,
where |Sout| denotes the cardinality of the set Sout. Since
Sout ⊆ L, we have |Sout| ≤ n and thus ζ ≤ n, which concludes
the first part of the proof.
To show that the columns of E are linearly independent,
we denote by Ei the i-th column of E, i ∈ {1, . . . , ζ}, and
we observe Ei can be written as a linear combination of the
form
Ei =
n∑
j=1
bijej ,
where ej denotes the j-th canonical vector of dimension n,
and bij ∈ {0, 1}, with bij = 1 only if link i belongs to path
pj . To conclude, we use the fact that the the graph contains ζ
edge-disjoint paths, namely, each pair of paths differ by at least
one edge, which shows that E contains ζ linearly-independent
columns and concludes the proof. 
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